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Abstract—Security and trust are essential building blocks
for the emerging Internet of Things (IoT)—both heavily rely
on ubiquitously available crypto primitives with integrity and
robustness. In the constrained IoT, this is a challenging desire
due to limited availability of memory, CPU cycles, energy, and
external data sources. Random input forms such a central crypto
primitive that is used virtually everywhere, but hard to obtain
on deterministically operated real-time devices without user
interface.
In this paper, we revisit the generation of randomness from
the perspective of an IoT operating system that needs to support
general purpose or crypto-secure random numbers. We analyse
the potential attack surface, derive common requirements, and
discuss the potentials and shortcomings of current IoT OSs. A
systematic evaluation of current IoT hardware components and
popular software generators based on well-established test suits
and on experimental performance measurements give rise to a
set of clear recommendations on how to build such a random
subsystem and which generators to use.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, operating system, pseu-
dorandom number generator, cryptographically secure PRNG,
physically unclonable function, statistical testing, performance
evaluation
I. INTRODUCTION
Random numbers are essential in computer systems to
enfold versatility and enable security. Almost every operating
system (OS) provides ways to generate random numbers.
Unfortunately, misconceptions about randomness are common
in the design and implementation of operating systems [1].
With this work, we want to shed light on the ever confusing
concept of randomness and guide the design of systems that
operate constrained embedded devices.
The emerging Internet of Things (IoT) is under way in-
troducing large quantities of resource-constrained, embedded
devices (i.e., Class 0 to Class 2 [2]) to the wild. They connect
via standard protocols to clouds or cloudlets on the global
Internet. Often they communicate autonomously via interfaces
that are wireless and require protection. Common methods of
self-organization and secure communication heavily rely on
random input.
Starting from Class 1, IoT nodes more and more utilize an
operating system instead of bare metal firmware. Over a dozen
open and closed source systems exist that can operate various
classes and types of devices. Our work is motivated from
the heart of the RIOT system design. RIOT [3] contributes
randomness to standard networking [4], security [5], resource
management [6], and other user functions. Random numbers
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are required in almost all security components to generate or
perpetuate secrets such as encryption keys or cypher streams.
In the literature, a “random sequence” is often referred to
with the definition by D. H. Lehmer:
A random sequence is a vague notion [. . . ] in
which each term is unpredictable to the uninitiated
and whose digits pass a certain number of tests
traditional with statisticians. [7]
True random sequences are generated from random physical
processes such as thermal noise, manufacturing inaccuracies,
or crystal drift. Current personal computers extend such
sources to sound or video input, disk drives, user keystrokes,
or other as proposed by the IETF [8]. These interfaces do not
necessarily exist on embedded devices. There may be comple-
mentary sources for gathering random input such as antenna
noise or sensor measurements. Still, collecting random values
is often difficult and resource-intensive because underlying
processes are slow or do not output continuously. Furthermore,
the use of additional hardware components during runtime
increases energy consumption.
Pseudo-random number generators (PRNG) are determinis-
tic algorithms that output sequences with random properties.
They require a truly random seed as input in order to be
unpredictable. If properly seeded, these generators expand a
comparably short seed value into a long sequence of random
numbers [9] while discontinuing to depend on (physical)
random processes. Using a PRNG also reduces the attack
surface for adversaries with physical device access. On low-
cost embedded platforms, however, it is hard to generate a
qualified seed if suitable hardware resources are missing. This
raises a major challenge for the operating system, as it needs
to abstract the hardware without sacrificing functionality.
In this paper, we explore the building blocks for proper
randomness in the constrained Internet of Things. We start
from the attack surface (§ II) and discuss the requirements
that emerge for random number generation (§ III) and its
embedding into a random IoT-OS subsystem (§ IV). The major
contribution of this paper follows with the systematic testing
and performance evaluation of common hardware and software
generators on IoT platforms. First, we recap the statistical test
suites (§ V) and then analyze popular off-the-shelf random
number hardware along with a seed generator based on PUFs
(Physically unclonable functions) (§ VI). Second, we perform
analogous tests and evaluations for pseudo-random number
generating software (§ VII) and deduce recommendations
for general purpose and crypto-secure generators in the IoT.
Comparing hardware and software performance properties and
resource consumptions leads us to further conclusions on how
to combine and jointly deploy these different components
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2(§ VIII). We summarize four clear recommendations that
immediately apply in practice in the conclusions (§ IX).
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§ IX Conclusions and Outlook
II. ATTACK SURFACE OF THE IOT RANDOM SUBSYSTEM
A variety of prominent attacks are based on vulnerabilities
of random number generators in real-world systems and the
literature provides a plethora of cryptographic analyses and at-
tack scenarios [9]–[22]. In reality, there are even more attacks
anticipated that target at zero day exploits. Kelsey, Schneier
et al. [13] criticize a lack of a widespread understanding
of possible attacks against random number generators among
system developers. Given the shortcomings of many random
subsystems, it is worth considering the corresponding attack
surface of a specific environment. An attack on a random
number generator is an intrusive attempt of distinguishing
between the produced sequence and truly random numbers.
This distinction would open doors to predict future outputs
or reproduce recent outputs that might have been used for
generation of secrets in the past. The situation becomes even
worse if an adversary manages to direct future numbers of
a random sequence. Kelsey et al. enumerate three classes of
analytical attacks:
Direct Cryptanalytic Attacks monitor PRNG outputs to gain
knowledge about the system in order to distinguish between
pseudo-random output and truly random bits.
Input-Based Attacks require access to PRNG inputs (seeds
and initializations vectors) to inject known test sequences and
perform further cryptoanalysis on random outputs.
State Compromise Extension Attacks base on previously
compromised internal state of the generator and enables pre-
diction or backtracking within the pseudo-random sequence.
Previous work focuses on the analytical aspects of random-
ness on regular PCs with human-machine interaction. This
approach is as well applicable in the case of interconnected
embedded devices with missing user interfaces. Francillon et
al. [10] present a more generic distinction for the case of
wireless sensor nodes that categorizes two types of attackers.
Remote Attackers mainly target at cryptanalytic and input-
based attacks. Without accessing the node directly, an adver-
sary tries to compromise or manipulate the generator state,
e.g., by monitoring and disturbing communication channels.
In this particular example, wireless noise has been used to
generate randomness. An adversary with access to the local
wireless network must thus be considered a potential threat to
perform an external attack.
Invasive Attackers have gained read access to the internals of
a generator and can compromise its state at one point in time.
This definition does not include write access, or code injection
by the attacker. Perfect state knowledge of a deterministic
pseudo-random algorithm allows the adversary to predict
future outputs and it can reproduce sequences that have been
generated in the past, i.e., for cryptographic key generation.
Unless true random vales are added to the generator state
periodically, the system remains fully predictable. The update
interval determines the maximum time that a generator remains
vulnerable. Compromising the state by read access is also
considered as an internal attack.
In the IoT, a large number of constrained embedded devices
inter-connect to each others and to the global Internet. On the
one hand, broadening the networking capabilities increases the
attack interface, especially with availability from the outside of
a local network. On the other hand, simple IoT devices entail
special considerations in comparison to traditional networked
devices such as servers, personal computers, or smartphones.
Many IoT devices are very constrained in hardware capabili-
ties due to minimizing price and form factors, as well as energy
resources. These limitations do not only affect computational
power, but often imply sparse hardware protection features. As
a consequence, IoT devices often lack permission management
for code execution, memory protection mechanisms, as well
as secret storages.
IoT deployments can grant physical access to the hardware,
which opens a potential interface to analyse and monitor del-
icate key material, firmware, or even program execution on a
device if tamper detection is not in place. We argue that secure
random number generation cannot be sustained in the case
that an adversary has full read or write access to the device.
Shielding attack vectors without read or write access demands
for additional hardware capabilities and manufacturers of low-
power chips already reacted. STMicroelectronics [12] defines
three groups of attacks against microcontrollers.
System Software Attacks focus on security and resilience
affected by weak implementations, bugs, or insecure proto-
cols after analyzing or even manipulating program execution.
Disturbances can be introduced even without device access via
network interfaces, e.g., by sending malicious packets, or by
triggering the execution of non-verified or untrusted library
functions that may be already part of the device firmware.
The latter is often related to “monkey testing” or to insider
knowledge.
Hardware Non-invasive Attacks require hardware access.
This category includes any kind of interface that allows
interacting with the device directly, such as debug ports, or bus
interfaces (UART, SPI, I2C, ...). The most dangerous attacks
for random sources that rely on physical processes are based
on fault injection. Typically, an adversary exploits the device
under environmental conditions that it is not designed for.
Prevalent fault injection parameters are temperature variations,
microwave induction or voltage manipulation. Furthermore,
side channel analysis such as power profiling and timing
analyses fall in this category.
Hardware Invasive Attacks cover very advanced techniques
that enable access to the device silicon and can be used to
access hidden secrets, even if device protection mechanisms
3are in place. This group of attacks is usually very complex
and only possible with the availability of specific measurement
instruments.
Recently, hardware manufacturers of low-power microcon-
trollers have started to provide different countermeasures to
the attack surface, ranging from debug port locks, tamper de-
tection indicators, memory protection units, and isolated code
execution environments. Also, hardware crypto acceleration
on one chip become popular. These features should be used
wherever possible. Nevertheless, many low-cost devices that
are supported by IoT operating systems do not provide all
(or any) of these capabilities, implementations and algorithms
used for random number generation should be designed around
the concepts of (i) a high modularity to ease partial use
of hardware protection features and (ii) robustness even if
hardware protection is missing.
Random number generation cannot be protected, if the
adversary has full control over the device. Analytic attacks as
well as fault injections can be shielded, though, by incorporat-
ing cryptographic primitives and carefully gathering entropy
for seeding the PRNG, as we will discuss in the following
section.
III. GENERATING RANDOMNESS IN THE IOT
Every day in the life of an IoT device, random numbers are
requested by a variety of use cases. These use cases separate
into two classes: either general purpose or cryptographically
secure random input. While general purpose use only requires
sufficiently well represented statistical properties, cryptograph-
ically secure random numbers must also remain unpredictable
even under malicious attacks. While the first category can be
achieved fairly easily, the provisioning of secure randomness
is very challenging in the constrained regime and—depending
on the attacker model and strength—may not be achievable at
all.
A. General Purpose PRNGs
General purpose PRNGs are employed for tasks inde-
pendent of security aspects. Typical use cases include the
jittering of network protocol timers or media access protocols
(e.g., random back-off in CSMA) to avoid collisions on a
medium. Other applications of general purpose PRNGs in-
clude randomized sampling of sensor measurements and fuzzy
testing.
A uniformly distributed stream of statistically independent
random numbers is the desired output of a PRNG, which
still should be approximated in higher dimensions, since
concurrent applications or algorithmic elements may call on
sub-sequences of the generator (e.g., access every k-th output).
Seeds between otherwise identical devices must differ to avoid
identical random behavior across devices, but an individual
seeding after each device restart is desired. Even though
seed requirements for general purposes are moderate, a “plug
and play” source for gathering seed material is missing on
IoT devices that do not provide a hardware random number
generator (HWRNG).
General purpose PRNGs are essential on most IoT devices
and frequently called in many use cases. Implementations
should therefore be very lightweight and efficient to preserve
resources of the constrained devices. Available resources are
better spent on generators with high security demands.
B. Cryptographically Secure PRNGs
Crypto-purpose or Cryptographically Secure PRNGs
(CSPRNG, as coined in the literature) are generators that are
safe to use in security applications, involving the generation
of cryptographic keys, nonces, or salts. Cryptographic system
security relies on theses random numbers as basic input.
Consequently, these generators are expected to output highly
unpredictable number sequences and to be resilient against
known attacks.
Building a crypto-purpose generator is more complex and
consumes higher system resources than a general purpose
PRNG. It involves additional building blocks of ciphers, cryp-
tographic hash functions, runtime tests, as well a specifically
robust seeding logic. Computational overhead and especially
memory requirements of these building blocks are in poten-
tial conflict with resource constraints of IoT nodes, but the
availability of secure random numbers is essential for enabling
secure communication over the Internet. In order to reduce
software complexity, some microcontrollers provide hardware
acceleration of cryptographic primitives, which should be
exploited when implementing the respective components.
A significant body of work reports about failures of PRNGs
and successful attacks against the random input of crypto sys-
tems [9], [10], [12], [13], [15], [16], [18]. Hence, provisioning
a cryptographically secure, consistent random infrastructure is
a crucial component of an IoT operating system, which should
be designed and tested with care. Requirements on CSPRNGs,
in-depth analyses of different mechanisms and classification
of those have been presented in [15], [16], [23]–[26]. We
summarize the key aspects of CSPRNGs in the following
paragraphs.
Statistical Randomness. Any statistical bias gives rise to
elementary attack vectors. Even though CSPRNGs mainly
consist of deterministic algorithms, a crypto-secure random
generator needs to produce sequences that are statistically
indistinguishable from truly random [13]. These properties
base on the assumption that in a string of (pseudo-random)
bits, probabilities for one and zero are equal at any time and
they are statistically independent. That means, guessing the
next bit of a sequence cannot be done with better chance than
50 %. Even a very small bias must be considered as potential
breach of the randomness assumption and contradicts crypto-
requirements of a secure generator. A variety of statistical
properties can be verified with tests that are available in well
established test suites (see Section V).
Unpredictability. CSPRNGs require resistance against ex-
ternal and internal attacks (compare Section II). A common
distinction exists between prediction resistance and backtrack-
ing resistance. In more detail, prediction resistance means that
an attacker cannot guess future results in computational time
by monitoring the generator history, even if the algorithm
4is perfectly known. To achieve this at a given statistical
quality, the seed needs to be fully unpredictable. Furthermore,
a crypto-secure PRNGs needs to be built on cryptographic
functions, usually one-way hash functions and block ciphers
that are practically not invertible and do not produce colliding
output from different inputs.
Every cryptographic system needs to be designed according
to a specified security level. An established threshold is 128
bit of secrecy [8], [27], [28]. Assuming an adversary had to
guess a secret value, it would require trying about half the
number of bit combinations, if all states are equally likely.
For 128-bit secrecy this would be 2128−1 tries on average
to brute force a collision, or 2128 in the worst case. This is
currently considered secure for computational resources. Both
the seed at the generator input, as well as the internals of
its algorithm need to meet the expected security level. It is
important to note that due to the birthday paradox, an attack
on a cryptographic hash function can complete with a reduced
number of tries [29], [30]. Furthermore, if an attacker gained
knowledge of the internal state of a generator, it should be
ensured that future output is only predictable for a very short
time. According to NIST, this should be achieved by adding
fresh and truly random values periodically to the internal
generator state (see Section III-C on re-seeding).
Backtracking resistance protects against a reconstruction
of previous values or even the seed after a state comprise.
It implies that no correlation between seeds and generated
output should be in place. This behavior is required to assure
perfect forward secrecy within cryptographic protocols [31].
Backtracking resistance is realized by applying cryptographic
functions to the internal state of the generator and hardened
by storing state in protected memory, if available.
High Entropy Seeding. A truly random seed value is required
to make the output of a CSPRNG unpredictable [25], [32].
Random bits are usually extracted from physical resources and
the Shannon entropy [33] or the Minimum entropy serve as a
measure of its randomness. In this context, physically random
resources are often referred to as entropy sources. Physical
sources of “randomness” typically exploit variations in elec-
tronic circuits (e.g., clock drifts, uninitialized memory, ADC
fluctuations), randomly noisy signals (e.g., wireless noise, bit
errors, thermal noise), or user input signals (e.g., key strokes,
mouse clicks) which normally are unavailable in the IoT. These
real-world entropy sources, however, do not always admit “full
randomness” and additional compression methods are often
needed for maximizing entropy. NIST [34] also advises that
seed generation should not rely on a single entropy source, for
resilience.
Full entropy seeds are required for secrecy in a CSPRNG,
which is equivalent to requiring 2n−1 tries on average, for
guessing a seed of length n bits. If not seeded with full
entropy, an adversary may exploit internal state collisions and
determine generator output faster. This can drastically degrade
the security strength of the generator. Hence, great care must
be taken to harvest the number of entropy bits that is required
by the cryptographic strength of the system as defined by
and compliant to the algorithm of the PRNG [35]. Caution
is advised with implementations that limit the input length of
the seeding function.
Fresh entropy may be required repeatedly to re-seed the
internal sate of a CSPRNG in order to recover from a potential
state compromise, or to serve multiple generator instances, as
we will discuss in the next section.
Health Testing. The quality of cryptographic system compo-
nents need particular attention, as it may degrade not only
due to software bugs, but also due to hardware aging or
side channel attacks. A variety of tests have been proposed
by NIST, which should be executed on all functions of a
PRNG. Additionally, there are procedures to test the behavior
of entropy sources. These tests range from known answer
testing during validation time up to health tests during runtime
to monitor vitality of the mechanisms. As the focus of this
contribution is not on testing, we refer the reader to the specific
NIST documents [25], [34], [36].
C. A Note on Re-seeding CSPRNGs
A CSPRNG can recover from potential state compromise by
regular re-seeding [13], [23], [25], [35]. Re-seeding of PRNGs
is often advised [10], [37], [38] but also under much debate in
the literature [9], [16], [39]. Certain CSPRNGs proposed by
NIST even build upon the concept of re-seeding [25].
Considering that a generator is perfectly secure and was
seeded in agreement with its specified security level, while
both its seed and its state are kept in full secrecy,then an
adversary cannot predict the next output by guessing within
computational time without any re-seeding. So re-seeding
becomes unnecessary. In this ideal scenario, the only reason
for re-seeding is to extend the finite period of the specific
pseudo-random algorithm. The period of a generator describes
the number of cycles it takes to run through all valid internal
states. In practice, however, computationally secure PRNGs
have long enough periods and are not affected by repeating
pseudorandom output during their lifetime in a common IoT
scenario.
Re-seeding can even be disadvantageous as it introduces
an interface to inject low entropy values to the internal state
during runtime. This may foster state collisions and thus break
the resilience against unpredictability.
Entropy is a fragile property that is (i) not always in place
(ii) in many cases manipulable at physical device access and
(iii) hard to estimate during runtime. Even worse, it may be
hard to depict failures in case of a compromise. To avoid
adding compromised entropy values during runtime, some
common security procedures base on a “trust on first use”
model [40], which contradicts the re-seeding approach.
Another vulnerability created by re-seeding was revealed
by Ristenpart et al. [16]. Existing implementations of entropy
collectors cache their outputs in memory pools because—due
to its eventually long and indeterministic runtime—entropy
gathering is often implemented as a parallel and asynchronous
task. If these numbers are not consumed immediately, a
memory without perfect secrecy exposes an attack vector.
Thus, entropy pools and internal states should run in trusted
execution environments, only. Especially on constrained IoT
5hardware, this is not always possible, which makes the case for
entropy generation on demand. Conversely, the utilization of
insecure memory technologies generally motivates re-seeding
with fresh entropy values.
Entropy sources can get compromised during operation,
but the opposite can happen, as well, if sources did not
provide full entropy during PRNG instantiation. In that case,
mixing additional entropy values to the internal state during
operation can be rescuing. Finally, few crypto-forums argue
that re-seeding protects in case of faulty implementations.
Faulty implementations at hand, however, contradict many
assumptions of a cryptographically secure system.
In summary, there are reasons in favor and against re-
seeding of PRNGs and we argue that a decision should be
made by the designer and account for the underlying hardware
capabilities, deployment considerations, application scenarios,
and security requirements in place. We conclude that a re-
seeding mechanism should be considered as an option, but
remain decoupled from the CSPRNG API. This recommenda-
tion applies to IoT environments that require modular software
in order to adapt to the heterogeneity of hardware platforms of
varying resources and diverse deployments in probably (phys-
ically) harsh environments. These considerations, however, are
not limited to resource constrained embedded devices, but
apply to regular PCs as well.
IV. RANDOMNESS IN IOT OPERATING SYSTEMS:
REQUIREMENTS AND RELATED WORK
A. General Requirements
Many system services require access to random input, and
it is common to expect a random function at the operating
system level. Use cases and applications of random numbers
differ largely, though, as we discussed in Section III. General
purpose PRNGs are needed to generate random events that fol-
low a uniform statistical distribution and are often consumed at
high frequencies. Security related contexts raise the additional
requirement of keeping random output unpredictable, why
crypto-secure generators need to maximize entropy with the
help of truly random input. Such input is on the one hand
difficult to obtain at often high cost, on the other hand truly
random sources frequently harvest from system hardware,
which is best accessed via the hardware abstraction of an
operating system.
Following this perspective, both general purpose and crypto-
secure random number generation should be part of an operat-
ing system, but are at the same time only versatile if they meet
the diverging requirements well. We argue that the different
use cases and requirements of PRNGs and CSPRNGs demand
for independent methods and APIs. Isolated random functions
cannot only be specifically optimized, but also prevent side
channel attacks against the CSPRNG via the general purpose
PRNG. Furthermore, separate APIs force developers to decide
for their individual use cases.
B. General Purpose PRNGs
Use cases for general purpose PRNGs require statistically
well distributed random sequences. First, single applications
should receive a different value out of the whole number
range on each request to avoid repeating patterns. Second,
multiple applications that request from a single PRNG instance
should experience the same properties, even if they access
only every k-th PRNG output. This requires a decent empirical
distribution in higher dimensions, which is often a challenge.
Security related applications should not use this generator
class as it may be too easy to predict. Furthermore, most
go-to PRNGs are invertible which allows to reconstructing
previos sequences. Different seeds must be generated across
devices to prevent a uniform collective behavior. Seeding with
a decent entropy is desired to provide varying sequences
between system restarts. Seeds may be accessed through the
hardware abstraction of the operation system, but should be
configurable to ease debugging.
General purpose PRNGs should require minimal system
resources to be applicable even on very constrained devices
and to act frugally while requested frequently. Efficiency
metrics involve processing time, as well as energy and memory
consumption. The latter can benefit from restricting state to a
single PRNG instance. A central instantiation logic can be
managed by the operating system.
C. Crypto-secure PRNGs
Core Requirements. Security related use cases require crypto-
secure PRNGs for sovereign tasks such as cryptographic
key generation. Delicate key material must be largely unpre-
dictable. A CSPRNG is expected to produce sequences that are
indistinguishable from truly random numbers, as discussed in
Section III-B. It is advisable to rely on approved CSPRNG
mechanisms that have been verified by trusted authorities and
an operating system or a public library can provide access
to implementations that are tested within this environment. A
CSPRNG internally consists of cryptographic functions [25] to
achieve backtracking resistance and the maximum achievable
prediction resistance (security strength) is typically given by
that function, though, the strength of the whole generator
should be specified by the designer of the approved algorithm.
In order to assure a predefined security strength, a high quality
seed must provide truly random data with a corresponding
amount of entropy during instantiation of the CSPRNG.
In contrast to general purpose PRNGs, CSPRNGs under-
take tasks like key generation, which is typically involved
less frequently, but also continuous encryption within stream
ciphers, thus, performance characteristics of CSPRNGs are
important but they are secondary in comparison to its security
qualifications. Still, computation of cryptographic primitives
and entropy conditioning can be costly [9], especially on
constrained embedded devices. The CSPRNG and the seed
generator as provided by an OS must comply to the constraints
of the target hardware and leave sufficient resources to deploy
a real-world firmware with the desired application logic. The
operating system should provide an optimized, configurable
environment to support this.
Minimal Standards. Crypto-secure PRNGs rely on true
random seeds that meet a security strength which determines
the required amount of entropy in the seed. At least one
6entropy source must be in place that meets the requirements.
The operating system should provide an entropy interface,
which grants access to true random values generated from
varying sources, dependent on underlying hardware capabili-
ties. Externally connected devices may provide true random
numbers as well, but typically require a device driver. An
operating system can simplify access to relevant components
by its hardware abstraction layer, and should additionally allow
for code re-use between different hardware platforms. The
need for configurability requires a highly modular architecture.
In the context of IoT software, configuration is commonly
done during compile time to keep firmware sizes small.
Tests are mandatory for generating robust and secure ran-
dom numbers [25], [34]. Both the pseudo-random algorithm
and the seed generation must be tested whereas testing pro-
cedures can be separated into a priori and live tests during
deployment. Due to device constraints, a priori tests at devel-
opment time should be favored to save resources on running
IoT nodes. Thereby, bug free execution of the deterministic
CSPRNG must be verified by comparing output sequences
against ground truth. Further, seed sources rely on physical
processes and should be evaluated within deployment condi-
tions, because their behavior can be affected by environmental
properties.
Optional Features. Entropy sources are essential for seed
creation, but the properties of underlying physical processes
are diverse. Environmental changes as well as attackers with
device access can affect their reliability (see Section II).
Involving multiple entropy sources during seed creation in-
creases seed resilience. Naturally, a physical process does
not provide full entropy, but conditioning is sometimes im-
plemented already in the hardware. For sources with sparse
entropy concentration, a compression mechanism is required.
An entropy module provided by the operating system can
increase seed quality and it should involve three fundamental
building blocks: (i) An estimate about the entropy amount per
input which can be provided by each source, (ii) an accu-
mulation instance to involve multiple sources and keeps track
of the amount of accumulated entropy and (iii) a compression
mechanism to create high entropy seeds with limited length to
meet security requirement of the CSPRNG. The entropy API
should thus provide an interface to pass security requirements
and it should also be able to report errors back to the CSPRNG.
Re-seeding a CSPNG is sometimes desired to recover from
potential state compromise (see Section III-C). We argue that
re-seeding should be kept optional because seed generation
may drain a significant amount of energy on every re-seed cy-
cle. Enabling and disabling that feature should be transparent
to the application that uses the CSPRNG.
Cryptographic protocols for different purposes require to
run on individual instantiations of a CSPRNG to prevent side
channel attacks. This affects the operating system in two ways.
First, seeding needs to be done separately for each instance—
in contrast to the unified approach suitable for general purpose
PRNGs. Second, every instantiation needs its own context
to be handled either internally within the boundaries of the
CSPRNG or externally, by dedicating context allocation to
the application. In both ways, the number of contexts should
be kept low in an IoT OS, because the CSPRNG state can
consume much memory. It is worth noting that IoT firmware
typically avoids dynamic memory allocation, why the number
of CSPRNG instantiations should be explicitly defined during
development.
The state of a generator needs protection and an oper-
ating systems should involve hardware security features, if
available. In more detail, secure memory technologies can
provide tamper detection along with authorized access and
recent low-power platforms even provide trusted executions
environments (e.g., ARM TrustZone 1) for protected code
execution. CSPRNG state, seeds, and entropy values should
be uninstantiated after use to avoid leakage via side chan-
nels. This is of particular importance when secure memory
is absent. Memory erasure is commonly done by setting
buffers to zero, though, instructions to “zeroize” a buffer
are often removed by compiler optimizations, which leaves
sensitive information in memory. Known solutions involve
explicit bzero implemented by the GNU C Library, as well as
service functions in cryptographic libraries such as libsodium 2
or Monocypher 3.
Optimizing Parameters. Modern off-the-shelf IoT devices
provide an on-chip hardware random number generator which
is commonly used as seed source for CSPRNGs. In addition,
accelerating hardware units are often in place and capable
of processing cryptographic primitives such as ciphers and
hashes. While most CSPRNG implementations base on a
pure software solution of their internal cryptographic func-
tions, a transparent substitution by hardware implementations
promises performance enhancements in terms of speed and
energy. The operation system can provide peripheral drivers
to control hardware accelerators and a transparent reconfigu-
ration, dependent on respective hardware capabilities, should
automatically select the most performant solution.
Furthermore, certain IoT boards provide an external hard-
ware acceleration chip mounted on the same PCB as the
microcontroller which is typically connected by a peripheral
bus. Transparently including this device class as (i) a crypto-
graphic accelerator or (ii) a full CSPRNG alternative can off-
load the main processor and potentially enable cryptographic
applications on very constrained devices that cannot run a
heavy-weight CSPRNG software.
D. IoT Implementations
Among the most prominent IoT operating systems nowa-
days are Contiki-NG, a successor of the original Contiki oper-
ating system [41], mbed OS [42], zephyr [43], Mynewt [44],
and RIOT [45], all of which implement methods to gather
random numbers. In the following, we give a brief overview
about current solutions in different OSes, and we focus on
RIOT afterwards.
1https://developer.arm.com/ip-products/security-ip/trustzone/
trustzone-for-cortex-m
2https://libsodium.gitbook.io
3https://monocypher.org
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microcontrollers, and MSP430 platforms, although its prede-
cessor Contiki provided support for a wider range of architec-
tures. Contiki-NG implements a sparse random subsystem that
does not distinguish between general purpose and cryptograph-
ically secure PRNGs. The random API is implemented as a
wrapper around peripheral HWRNG drivers of a platform and
an approved CSPRNG is not available. The interface provides
a seed function that limits the input size to an unsigned short
integer but it is left unimplemented in most cases, because
the on-board HWRNG does not require a seed. In case of
missing hardware random number support, the random module
falls back to the C library function rand which maps to a
lightweight linear congruential PRNG in most C libraries.
An entropy module for seed generation, implementations of
hardware accelerators, tests, and error indication interfaces are
missing in Contiki-NG.
mbed OS is the ARM operating system for processors of the
ARM Cortex-M family. mbed implements one PRNG for gen-
eral purpose random number generation based on the Xorshift
generator with 128-bit internal state (Xoroshiro128+). The
general purpose API provides an interface to re-seed the inter-
nal state. ARM maintains an SSL library (mbed TLS [46]) next
to the operating system. This library is included in the mbed
operating system for secure random number generation, and it
can be ported to other software projects as well. On the upper
layer, this library implements the CSPRNGs HMAC DRBG
and CTR DRBG as proposed by NIST [25]. Implementations
include external state handling, re-seeding procedures, and a
collection of self tests. Cryptographic hardware acceleration
is supported too. On the lower layer, the mbed TLS library
implements a dedicated module for entropy gathering, which
(i) is capable of accumulating multiple entropy sources, (ii)
provides an interface to add personal entropy sources, (iii) can
be used in a blocking and non-blocking fashion until certain
entropy requirements are met, (iv) distinguishes between weak
or strong entropy requirements, and (v) can be compiled with
different complexity levels. When used on Cortex-M devices,
the only built-in entropy input is the HWRNG of a platform
which is expected to return full entropy values without further
estimation, thus, an adequate HWRNG has to be in place
for cryptographic operations and it cannot be replaced by
alternative entropy sources that only provide partial entropy
bits per sample. Both generator classes are seeded by the
entropy module of mbed TLS.
Zephyr supports a large variety of ARM Cortex-M based
32-bit IoT platforms as well as x86, ESP32, ARC, NIOS II
and RISC-V based boards. The operating system implements
a PRNG for general purposes (Xoroshiro128+) and the ex-
ternal mbed TLS and tinycrypt [47] libraries are ported to
zephyr, which include crypto-purpose generators specified by
NIST [25] (HMAC DRBG and CTR DRBG). The adaptation
for running both libraries within zephyr does not include
hardware abstraction for crypto accelerators. A collection
of tests implemented within mbed TLS and tinycrypt can
be executed from the operating system and it additionally
provides benchmarks for generators of both libraries. Zephyr
has an entropy interface that is used to seed both PRNG types.
It can be accessed either in a blocking or non-blocking fashion.
The interface is implemented as a peripheral HWRNG driver,
which is expected to return full entropy, still, it does not sup-
port accumulation of different entropy sources. The fallback
entropy source in case of missing hardware capabilities is a
predictable timer or counter based solution. The entropy API
implements a basic error interface to indicate this kind of
deficits.
Mynewt is an operating system that supports about 40
boards, most of which with an ARM Cortex-M based 32-
bit microprocessor and the minority involves MIPS or RISC-
V architectures. Similar to Contiki-NG, it uses the C library
function rand() for requesting general purpose random num-
bers. Both mbed TLS and tinycrypt libraries are available
for cryptographically secure random number generation. In
both cases, cryptographic functions are processed in software.
Selftests from mbed TLS can be executed within the operating
system, whereas tinycrypt tests are not included. To seed
the CSPRNGs, an interface to the HWRNG driver of the
microcontroller is supplied.
RIOT currently supports around 170 boards and 30 differ-
ent microcontroller families ranging from 8-bit AVR devices
with sparse peripherals, 16-bit MSP430 devices, up to 32-
bit processors of the ARM Cortex-M family and ESP32
with various MCU peripherals including dedicated HWRNG
circuits, as well as ARM7, MIPS, and RISC-V based mi-
crocontrollers. RIOT implements a collection of PRNGs that
range from lightweight general purpose algorithms to crypto-
purpose generators. Among other embedded crypto libraries,
RIOT also includes tinycrypt, and it additionally offers support
for relic [48], but the external CSPRNGs are not yet integrated
into the random subsystem. A central random API unifies
access to pseudo-random numbers, regardless of different
requirements. At the API level, there is currently no differ-
entiation between general purpose and crypto-secure PRNGs.
All PRNGs that are natively supported in RIOT work on a
single internal state. This forbids running multiple instances
of one generator and prevents external state maintenance. A
test application with user interaction via the shell allows to
test vitality and basic performance metrics of a generator.
The random interface provides two initialization functions
for PRNG seeding, one of which seeds with a 32-bit integer
value and the other initializes an array of variable length.
Neither the initialization function nor the random request
function provide an interface for error reporting in case of
low entropy seeding, or internal errors of the generator. As
a seed, either the output of a HWRNG or an SRAM PUF
seeder feed the instantiation function of a PRNG. In case
of a missing entropy source, the CPUID or a static value
compiled to the firmware are currently involved for seeding.
The CPUID has zero entropy but as a minimum, it provides
varying start values between multiple boards. The compiled
value provides entropy between build processes because it is
generated by a running PRNG on the development system.
This solution prevents re-usage of one binary for multiple
controllers which complicates deployment. Both mechanisms
8provide zero variation between reboots, and they should not
be used in a real-world deployment. An advanced entropy
module that involves multiple sources, estimates the amount
of accumulated entropy and exposes an interface to request a
specific number of entropy bits is yet missing in RIOT.
V. STATISTICAL TEST SUITES FOR RANDOM NUMBERS
The statistical quality of random sequences can be em-
pirically analyzed. There are many methods and tools to
test for random properties. The NIST Statistical Test Suite
(STS) [24] and the DIEHARDER Random Number Test
Suite [49] combine series of such tests. They have established
as standard tools and are openly available. Both suites base
on hypothesis tests that analyse the input against the null
hypothesis of perfect randomness. This hypothesis implies
that fully deterministic pseudo-random sequences with ideal
random properties cannot be distinguished from truly random
values. Conversely, even ideal random sources may produce
sequences that appear to have non-random properties, which
can lead to failures of statistical tests occasionally—usually
referred to as type-1 error.
A. NIST Statistical Test Suite
The NIST STS consists of 15 different test cases, some
of which are executed repeatedly, leading to a number of
188 statistics that are processed on each run. With respect
to the input size recommendation for each test [24], we apply
the test suite version sts-2.1.2 to 100 Mbit generator output.
Every test is repeated 100 times with 1 Mbit test sequences.
A single test returns a probability value (p-value) and it is
expected to accept the hypothesis of perfect randomness with
a confidence of 1 − α, if the value lies above a significance
level of α = 0.01. Otherwise, the hypothesis of randomness
is rejected and the result is interpreted as failure. Each test
is applied repeatedly which results in a vector of p-values.
The proportion of passed sequences for one test is determined
using the confidence interval. As a next step, the distribution
of p−values for each test is analyzed using a chi-squared test
(χ2)-test, which outputs a second order probability value (p2-
value). The test suite defines a significance level of α2 =
0.0001 for testing this distribution.
B. DIEHARDER Random Number Test Suite
The DIEHARDER test suite subsumes 31 tests to analyse
statistics of random input streams. These tests are executed
with varying parameters, thus, a full run calculates a total of
122 test statistics. We apply the DIEHARDER test suite ver-
sion 3.31.1 with default options to streams of raw binary out-
puts. In default mode, the number of repetitions of a specific
test varies between psamples in [1,1000] and the sequence
length is variable between tsamples in [100,65000000] which
demands for much more random input data in comparison to
the NIST STS. Repeated executions deliver multiple probabil-
ity values (p-values) for each test, similar to the NIST tests. A
Kuiper Kolmogorov Smirnov test (KS-test) is applied to test
deviations from the expected distribution, which results in a
second order probability value (p2-value).
In DIEHARDER, a test passes if its p2-value lies above a
significance level of α2 = 0.000001, below (1 − α2), and it
fails otherwise. The result is considered as weak if p2-value
lies above αw = 0.005 and below (1−αw). It is again worth
noting that even truly random numbers might generate weak
results occasionally.
C. Other Test Suites
Donald E. Knuth was one of the pioneers who described
randomness tests in early editions of The Art of Computer
Programming [50] and his tests are part of most established
test suites today.
NIST released the first random number tests in 1994 within
the FIPS 140-1 [51] standard, which specified four statistical
test. In 2001, these tests were updated in FIPS 140-2 [52]
with a narrowing of the test criteria. Both documents served as
predecessors for the NIST Statistical Test Suite (STS) released
in 2010, which includes all 140 FIPS test cases as a subset. The
Diehard test suite was published in 1995 by Marsaglia [53],
who had been active in this field since years. The test suite
implements a collection of 18 test cases, which are a central
part of the DIEHARDER test environment, which has been
developed since 2003. Both NIST STS and DIEHARDER
are well known and accepted as standard tools for statistical
testing of random number generators [54], [55].
The TestU01 library [54], [56] was introduced in 2007. It
includes the majority of tests from NIST STS, Diehard, as
well as additional tests proposed in literature. Its purpose is
to provide an “extensive set of software tools for statistical
testing of RNGs.” [54], which led to a larger variety of
tests, larger sample sizes and an extended test parametrization
in comparison to the other suites. At the core, the envi-
ronment implements hypothesis tests similar to NIST STS
and DIEHARDER, but instead of rejecting a hypothesis, it
simply reports p-values outside the interval [0.001, 0.9990].
TestU01 can be executed on four complexity levels, of which
the most comprehensive one (BigCrush) involves up to 160
test statistics. Generation of the required amount of random
data can take a long time, in particular when generated on
microcontrollers and transmitted via the UART to feed the
library. This drastically increases time requirements of the
evaluation process.
A range of other test environments are less prominent in
the literature. The SPRNG (Scalable Parallel Random Number
Generators) [57] library is a tool to optimize distributed
processing for parallel random number generation and it
additionally contributes a few standard tests already covered
by NISTS STS and DIEHARDER. The ENT test program [58]
defines a small-scale environment that executes only five
statistical tests. It relies on a file based data input, which is
not practical when huge datasets have to be analyzed. The
CryptRndTest package [59] analyses cryptographic random
numbers, focusing on high precision floating-point numbers
with lengths larger than 64 bits. The latter is uncommon in
the IoT.
9Board Chip Entropy Source Post-processing Error Handling
ST NUCLEO-F410RB STM32F4 3 Free-running ROs Bias Correction + LFSR Health Tests
Phytec IoT Kit 2 MKW22D 2 Free-running ROs LFSR Status Indication
Nordic nRF52840 DK nRF52840 Thermal Noise Bias Correction Status Indication
Zolertia RE-Mote CC2538 RF Noise (seed only) 16-Bit PRNG –
Atmel SAM R21 XPRO SAMD21 – – –
Arduino Mega 2560 MEGA2560 – – –
Openlabs Radio Breakout AT86RF233 RF Noise – –
Microchip
CryptoAuth XPRO-B
ATECC(5—6)08A Quantum Mechanical
Circuit Variations
FIPS CSPRNG Health Tests
(ATECC608A)
TABLE I: Overview of the typical on- and off-chip IoT hardware with their random features that we analyze. (Abbreviations:
RO=Ring Oscillator, LFSR=Linear Feedback Shift Register, RF=Radio Frequency).
VI. HARDWARE GENERATED RANDOM NUMBERS
Common off-the-shelf IoT platforms sometimes provide
hardware generated random numbers. While some platforms
implement “true random” circuits for entropy gathering on the
same chip as the CPU, others implement pseudo-random gen-
erators in hardware. Still, many microcontrollers do not offer
random hardware at all. In these cases, external components
such as transceivers or cryptographic co-processors may be
connected to a bus and contribute true random numbers. As an
alternative, advanced mechanisms can extract random physical
properties from manufacturing variations of the microcon-
troller itself. In this section, we analyse typical IoT hardware
platforms from different manufacturers, CPU architectures,
and feature sets. Results are summarized in Table I. We run
RIOT-2020.01 as operating system with a collection of custom
measurement programs.
Both the STM32F4 [60] and MKW22D [61] chips supply
a HWRNG that gathers entropy from sampling multiple free
running and jittering oscillators, followed by a post processor
based on a linear shift register that ensures statistically well
distributed numbers. They also cover basic runtime health
tests implemented in hardware, as proposed by NIST [34].
Although the data sheets claim to pass the NIST statistical test
suite, the manufacturer NXP recommends against its direct
use for cryptographic applications in place of an approved
CSPRNG:
It is important to note there is no known cryp-
tographic proof showing this is a secure method
of generating random data. In fact, there may be
an attack against this random number generator
if its output is used directly in a cryptographic
application. The attack is based on the linearity of
the internal shift registers. Therefore, it is highly
recommended that this random data produced by
this module be used as an entropy source to provide
an input seed to a NIST-approved pseudo-random-
number generator based on DES or SHA-1. [61]
The nRF52840 by Nordic [62] implements a HWRNG
based on sampled thermal noise followed by an optional post
processor that reduces bias. Even though the reference manual
describes the mechanism as suitable for cryptographic pur-
poses, our results indicate a slightly different picture without
the post processor, as we will show later in this section.
The Texas Instruments CC2538 microcontroller [63] imple-
ments a PRNG in hardware, which internally consists of a 16-
bit shift register. Hence, its period is limited to 215. In contrast
to HWRNG peripherals of the previous microcontrollers, this
device implements a pseudo-random algorithm controlled by
the same API that is commonly used to request true ran-
dom data from on-chip generators. The PRNG is seeded by
noise samples on the receive path of the on-chip radio. A
similar approach is established on the standalone AT86RF233
transceiver module [64], which produces all random values by
observing noise from the radio.
The ATECC508A [65] is a feature-rich cryptographic co-
processor that runs a NIST-approved CSPRNG combined with
an internal seed which is inaccessible from the outside. The
seed is automatically updated on every power or sleep cycle or
on demand. In addition, the seed is generated internally based
on entropy extraction from quantum mechanical variations of
the circuitry:
In the crypto devices, the random seed comes from
variations at a quantum scale within the device.
The inherent quantum mechanical entropy of the
circuitry within the device provides a truly random
seed. [66]
Table I also lists the SAMD21 and the MEGA2560 micro-
controllers by Atmel as examples of the numerous off-the-
shelf devices, which completely lack hardware based random
sources. This class of devices heavily benefits from external
co-processors as well as internally generated entropy from
physical resources that can seed an approved software PRNG.
A. SRAM PUF Seeder
Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) are one solution
to generate unpredictable numbers even without dedicated
electronic circuits. They extract unique output from individual
hardware properties. Here, we focus on SRAM PUFs because
this memory technology is present on almost all available
microcontrollers. Transistor variations of memory cells lead
to varying states after device power-on. The startup state of
multiple memory blocks form a device-unique pattern plus
additional noise, which can be extracted, compressed and used
as PRNG seed values [67]–[70].
1) OS Integration:
Seed Generation. The mechanism of a PUF-based seeder is
visualized in Figure 1 for the example of RIOT. It operates
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Fig. 1: PUF SRAM random seeder integration in RIOT.
during system startup prior to OS kernel initialization and
reads out uninitialized SRAM cells. A PUF measurement
is compressed by the lightweight DEK hash to build a
high entropy 32 bit number that seeds a PRNG during its
instantiation, afterwards in the OS startup sequence. It is
noteworthy that the lightweight DEK hash is not a crypto-
graphic function.Furthermore, 32 bit entropy is not sufficient
for cryptographic use, but the mechanism is extensible to
cryptographic requirements.
Re-seed Power Cycle. Only startup state of uninitialized
memory after re-powering provides high entropy values. Either
a power-off cycle or a low-power cycle without memory
retention is required to generate a new seed. Among others,
the required minimum power-off time depends on ambient
conditions, age and properties of the power source. In our
experiments, an off-time of 1 sec. has proven suitable for
all platforms. A more detailed analysis about the impact of
environmental and experimental conditions to the SRAM PUF
properties has been presented by Schrijen et al. [71].
Nevertheless, soft resets or low-power cycles with memory
retention can occur and trigger the startup routine that should
not perform a new memory measurement in the absence of a
power-off cycle. For a solution, a simple soft-reset detection
mechanism writes a randomly chosen marker at a known
and reserved address in the SRAM. During the subsequent
startup, this memory address is inspected and a new memory
measurement is only performed if the marker has disappeared.
Otherwise, a soft-reset counter is incremented, added to the
previously generated seed and the result is hashed again for
creating a new seed value, which is then stored for the next
cycle. The last seed, as well as the soft reset counter could be
stored in protected memory for crypto-safe operations.
2) Evaluation of SRAM PUF Seeds:
Next, we analyse SRAM properties on common off-the-shelf
microcontrollers and present results for the SAMD21 in Ta-
bles II and III.
Memory Properties. As a first step, we inspect the random
properties of the memory in detail. We analyse intra- and
inter-device variations between multiple PUF responses at
Device A B C D E
(i) Entropy 4.2 % 5.5 % 5.3 % 4.7 % 5.5 %
(ii) Weight 50.7 % 49.5 % 51.3 % 49.8 % 53.1 %
TABLE II: Min. Entropy and Hamming Weight between 50
reads of 1 kB SRAM on five SAMD21 MCUs (A–E) at
ambient temperature.
Device Pair A–B A–C A–D A–E
(iii) Distance 49.2 % 49.8 % 50.1 % 50.4 %
TABLE III: Fractional Hamming Distance from 50 reads
of 1 kB SRAM between five SAMD21 MCUs at ambient
temperature.
ambient conditions. Therefor, we calculate (i) the minimum
entropy as a measure of randomness and (ii) the hamming
weight to determine bias between multiple startups of one
device as well as (iii) the fractional hamming distance between
different device responses to quantify inter-device uniqueness.
Results for (i) and (ii) indicate existence of a relative min.
entropy around 5 % and unbiased patterns. A relative fractional
distance of approximately 50 % in (iii) indicates uniqueness
of device responses.
Seed Properties. For determining the proper size of memory
used for seed generation we evaluate the minimum seed
entropy for varying input lengths and different platforms as
visualized in Figure 2 (left). All measurements converge to
approximately 31-Bit entropy with 1 kB SRAM, which is a
decent result.
Next, we test the distribution of hamming distances between
multiple generated seeds on every device against normal
distribution, using a simple KS-test. The probability function
in Figure 2 indicates that seed distances on all devices follow a
normal distribution with an average expectation value of 0,52
which is slightly biased by the influence of the MEGA2560
platform. Still, all four controllers pass the test with probability
values greater than 0,95, which allows to accept that they are
unique and uncorrelated.
B. Statistical Analysis with NIST STS
We now evaluate the statistical properties of all hardware
based random sources from Table I by applying the NIST
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test suite. Following the input size recommendation for each
test [24], we test 100 Mbit of random data. Every test is
repeated 100 times, which results in 1 Mbit test sequences.
Random integers are generated on the constrained device and
fed into the evaluation tool overt UART. It is worth noting that
already the serial transmission of the data takes at least 45 min.
with a baud rate of 115200. This added to the randomness
generation time which led to experiment times ranging from
one to over two hours per run. The experiment was executed
under office conditions at ambient temperature.
Results of the χ2-test on the distribution of p-values are
shown in Figure 3. Certain tests produce multiple p2-values
and we show the average in that case. We display passing tests
with gray bars, and we highlight failed tests with hatched red
bars or red arrows in case that the p2-value is too small to be
displayed. The test suite additionally calculates a proportion
of passed test runs and evaluates its significance. Passing tests
in Figure 3 have a significant proportion within the confidence
interval calculated from α = 0.01.
All generators but the nRF52840 (w/o bias correction) and
the CC2538 show good statistical properties and pass the
test suite. The STM32F4 indicates one failure for the Block
Frequency test which analyses the proportion of ones in blocks
of 128 bit length. A repeated experiment led to similar results,
so we consider this behavior a weakness of that HWRNG.
The nRF52840 provides an optional bias correction that
is applied to the sampled noise. With enabled correction
the nRF52840 (w/ bias correction) passes all statistical tests
without deficits. If the post-processor is disabled to increase
performance, it fails several of the test statistics as visible in
Figure 3. As we will see later, the bias correction requires
notably more system resources. We repeated the statistical
experiment with and without bias correction multiple times
with similar results.
The CC2538 consists of a simple 16-bit linear shift register
PRNG that (i) shortens the generator period (see Section III-C)
and (ii) can be attacked with sparse processing resources due
to the linearity of the internal shift registers. Correspondingly,
it fails in most of the tests.
C. Performance Analysis
Throughput. We measure the throughput and generation
time of different random sources on the STM32F4 platform
as well as the internal generators of the other devices listed in
Table I. Our test measures the throughput as a single-threaded
application that generates streams of pseudo-random numbers
continuously, and we count the number of values produced
within an interval of 10 seconds. In addition, we measure the
time of a single (blocking) function call that returns a random
integer with an oscilloscope by toggling an I/O pin via direct
register access on the test device. In this way the measurement
overhead remains negligible. The ATECC508A crypto-chip
always processes 32 Bytes per request even if only integer
values are requested. We display rates, average processing
times per random integer, and their standard deviation in
Table IV.
Clearly, the PUF based seeder as well as the externally
connected devices perform two up to four orders of magnitudes
Generator Rate[kB/s]
Avg. time
per Int. [us]
σ time
per Int. [us]
STM32F4
+ PUF SRAM – 296.46 5 0.16
+ ATECC508A 3 11609.69 6 889.96
+ AT86RF233 25 150.48 0.08
+ HWRNG 1994 1.95 0.04
MKW22D 316 33.08 0.08
nRF52840
w/o bias correction 15 246.04 2.25
w/ bias correction 6 600.28 57.03
CC2538 503 6.25 0.37
TABLE IV: Hardware Generated Random Numbers: Through-
put and processing time.
slower in comparison to the on-chip generator of the STM32F4
that returns random values via direct register access. It is
important to note that our measurements for the SRAM based
seeder only include processing times of the generator itself. In
practice, the required power-off cycle as well as the OS startup
are added, which can take tens to hundreds of milliseconds
and is heavily dependent on the OS configuration. However,
in the all-day use of an IoT-device, low power cycles occur
repeatedly. The cryptographic co-processor ATECC508A is
notably the slowest but it is the only candidate that runs
a hardware based cryptographically secure random number
generator. Its performance strongly relates to the mode of
its device driver 4. In our measurements, we use the polling
mode, which queries the device for the completed execution
4–7 times before random data is ready. Alternatively, in the
non-polling mode, the driver waits a maximum execution time
for each command, after which the data is ready to be fetched
from the co-processor. This potentially increases execution
times but leaves room for parallel processes to be scheduled
or low-power sleeping. Furthermore, the ATECC508A as well
as the AT86RF233 transceiver require additional I2C/SPI
transmissions in comparison to the on-chip solutions.
Among different MCUs on-chip generators, the STM32F4
performs fastest. Although its CPU runs with the highest
frequency (96 MHz), the processing time is not directly pro-
portional to the CPU speed. In comparison, the MKW22D
implements a similar HWRNG and runs at half the CPU
speed (48 MHz), but calculates more than ten times longer to
a produce random integer value. The CC2538 unsurprisingly
operates comparably fast as it only operates a simple shift
register without sampling noise. Both configurations of the
nRF52840 generator indicate low throughput of 6–15 kB/s in
comparison to the other generators, which presumably relates
to the internal sampling procedure. The bias correction leads
to statistically good properties of the output sequences but it
reduces computational speed by a factor of 2.5.
Energy Consumption. To evaluate the energy consumption
of each generator, we measure the current consumption of all
hardware based approaches with a digital sampling multimeter
(Keithley DMM7510 7 1/2) at 1 MS/s and we drive the board
4https://github.com/MicrochipTech/cryptoauthlib
5Does not include time for power-off cycle
6ATECC508A always produces 32 Byte blocks
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Fig. 3: Hardware Generated Random Numbers: χ2-test results on the distribution of probability values from 15 NIST STS
tests. p2-values ≥ 0.0001 pass the hypothesis of uniformity.
from an external regulated voltage supply. All development
boards provide a measurement header to probe the current
that flows to the microcontroller. For the externally connected
devices, we additionally measure the current to the power
supply pin. Some HWRNGs execute at the same scale as
the sampling resolution, thus, we measure generation of 1000
integers per run in that case and normalize the cumulated
values afterwards. We repeat every experiment 1000 times.
In setups that involve external hardware, we measure the
MCU and the external device separately. If applicable, we
separate microcontroller and external device consumption in
our graphs.
Figure 4 displays our test results on the energy consumption.
The radio based approach as well as the SRAM based seeder
consume one order of magnitude more energy than the on-
chip generated numbers, and the crypto-chip even requires
two orders higher resources. The ATECC508A clearly has
the highest energy footprint, which is strongly related to the
device driver implementation. As depicted in Table IV the co-
processor requires more than 11 ms to process the next output,
during which the MCU is polling the co-processors status.
While co-processing, though, the MCU is free to process other
data or to go to a deeper sleep mode for energy saving. As
depicted in Figure 4, the microcontroller consumed the larger
portion of energy up to 190µJ. Furthermore, the ATECC508A
produces a minimum of 32 random bytes per request, thus, up
to eight integers can be fetched for the same cost.
Second most energy hungry after the cryptographic co-
processor is the radio based random generation. Although
this approach is ten times faster, it only saves a factor of
four in energy, which is due to the higher current draw of
approximately 12.5 mA in receive mode of the AT86RF233
during random bit generation. The ATECC508A on the other
hand only drives around 3 mA during operation. Results for
the SRAM based seed generator scale similar to the radio
based approach. It is worth noting that we only display the
PUF SRAM overhead here that comes on top of a power-off
cycle. Results for on-chip generators reflect similar properties
as the processing times. The consumed energy to produce
one random integer is below 3.5 uJ on all four HWRNGs.
STM32F4 is notably the most economic competitor and it
reduces the consumption per integer to less than 0.35 uJ.
The difference in energy consumption of the two nRF52840
modes lies about a factor of 2.5, which increases only a little
lower than the processing times listed in Table IV. Still, bias
correction introduces a notable increase in processing time and
thereby in energy consumption.
VII. SOFTWARE GENERATED PSEUDO-RANDOM
NUMBERS
Since von Neumann’s early work [72], the generic method
of obtaining pseudo-random numbers builds up on some
(deterministic) function that is iteratively applied to a (random)
seed and attempts to approximate the output of uniformly dis-
tributed, independent random trials. As of today, very many of
such pseudo-random software generators exist, which comply
to various random quality and complexity requirements. From
the perspective of an IoT operating system, we are interested in
two types of highly efficient, memory-strained algorithms: (1)
an ultra-lightweight general purpose PRNG, and (2) a crypto-
secure PRNG that meets the resource constraints of class 1 IoT
devices. In the following, we will introduce and analyse eight
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Fig. 4: Hardware Generated Random Numbers: Energy con-
sumption of external (left) and internal on-chip generators
(right).
popular generators—four complex generators of high quality
and four lightweight candidates for general purpose random
generators in the IoT.
We apply the NIST, DIEHARDER, and the TestU01 test
suites to these PRNGs using RIOT as our platform. Our test
programs run as RIOT native processes on Linux servers
to speed up experiment time. Thereby, we instantiated all
generators with the same seed, except for the CTR PRNG
and the NIST Hash DRBG that are not integrated into the
random subsystem and both impose specific requirements on
the seed.
A. Complex Generators
Fortuna. The Fortuna PRNG is considered a cryptographic
random number generator (DRG.4 [23]) and was designed
to overcome the demand for entropy estimators that tend
to be complex and inaccurate [38]. Internally, the Fortuna
algorithm maintains pools of entropy from which a periodic re-
seeding is performed. Pools are filled from different available
entropy sources, whose values are distributed among these
pools. The entropy accumulation is conducted by hashing the
internal generator state and one entropy pool at a time using a
SHA-256 function. That mechanism allows generating random
sequences of unlimited period, though, it cannot overcome
the requirements for proper entropy sources for seeding the
generator and for updating entropy pools. Potential side effects
of re-seeding have been discussed in Section III-C. The final
blocks of pseudo-random output are generated by an AES-128
block cipher in counter mode.
CTR PRNG. The CTR PRNG is a cryptographic generator
(DRG.4 [23]) specified and approved by NIST [25]. It is
based on a 128 bit AES block cipher in counter mode, why
it provides 128 bit security strength. To achieve this, the
generator requires seeds of at least 128 bits entropy. The
tinycrypt library implementation, though, which we use in our
subsequent evaluation, requires seeds with a minimum length
of 256 bits. This is in contrast to all other implementations
presented in this section.
SHA256PRNG. The SHA256PRNG is a generator that pro-
vides cryptographically strong random numbers (DRG.2 [23]).
The original mechanism of this generator was introduced in
FIPS 186–1 [73] and analyzed by Kelsey et al. [13] and Desaj
et al. [74]. Outputs are generated by hashing the internal
generator state, after which the internal state is updated by
a linear transformation of the hash.
SHA256PRNG is the successor of the SHA1PRNG, which
became popular as the choice of the Java SecureRandom class.
Until recently, it was considered secure [75] but got deprecated
in Android N7. The reasons for deprecation mainly relate to a
seeding bug in Java and to NIST deprecating the underlying
SHA-1 hash function because Wang et al. [76], [77] discovered
an attack that decreased the number of brute-force tries needed
to foster state collisions from 280 to 263 operations. For that
reason, SHA256PRNG replaces the SHA-1 output function by
SHA-256.
The generator is forward secure up to the previous-to-
last state, which can be recovered from the current generator
output by inverting the state update function. SHA256PRNG
is confined to a single hash computation per block, which
makes it computationally efficient. To add full forward secrecy
NIST developed a collection of improved and standardized
random bit generators [25], the deployment of which has been
recommended in succeeding revisions of the FIP 186 [78], [79]
standard.
We briefly discuss results about the NIST Hash DRBG
(using the SHA-256 hash) at the side. It extends the
SHA256PRNG by a cryptographic function that hashes the
internal generator state to harden backtracking resistance after
state compromise. This requires two hash computations on
each block. The NIST Hash DRBG additionally implements
an approved re-seeding mechanism to achieve unpredictability
even after state compromise (DRG.4 [23]).
Mersenne Twister. The Mersenne Twister is a widely used
generator, which in its default version is known to be non-
secure [80], even though crypto-secure variants have been
explored successively. Known advantages of that algorithm
are a long period and comparably fast operations, because the
generation of pseudo-random numbers avoids multiplication
and division. Instead, it requires a large internal buffer of 624
integers.
B. Lightweight Generators
Tiny Mersenne Twister. The Tiny Mersenne Twister is a
derivate of the original Mersenne Twister that adapts to re-
source constraints on the price of a narrowed scope. It heavily
reduces buffer requirements, on the price of a shortened period
length. The generator is rather a reduced, memory efficient
fallback solution of the full Mersenne Twister [81].
Xorshift. The Xorshift generator belongs to the family of
linear-feedback shift register generators that are not crypto-
7https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/06/
security-crypto-provider-deprecated-in.html
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graphically secure. It is known for its resource efficiency
as it is confined to simple XOR and shift operations. In
its simplest 32 bit state generator, we refer to it in the
following. Marsaglia [82] proposed a collection of extended
Xorshift PRNGs with an increased period length and improved
statistical properties. Vigna et al. analyzed and improved
these generators further [83]–[85]. We briefly discuss results
about the Xorshift64* and the Xoroshiro128+ derivatives at
the side, which we integrated into RIOT for comparison.
The Xorshift64* consists of a 64 bit state and applies a
constant multiplication to the output for bit scrambling. The
Xoroshiro128+ requires 128 bit state, although it only outputs
64 bit values per cycle. In contrast to Xorshift64* it adds two
consecutive state values as a nonlinear transformation to the
output.
Park-Miller ”Minimal Standard”. The Minimal Standard
algorithm is a linear congruential generators (LCG) and has
been known for decades [86]. Motivated by its objective
to design a lightweight generator that is confined to 32 bit
arithmetic without divisions, it was criticized for its statistical
properties repeatedly [87]. The generator has a period or
231 − 1, and it is limited to produce 31 pseudo-random bits
during each cycle. In RIOT, however, the API presumes 32 bit
random integers, thus, one integer is generated by combining
two generator outputs on each random request, which limits
the usable period to 230−1. LCGs are generally not designed
for cryptographic purposes.
Knuth LCG. The Knuth LCG is a widely used linear
congruence generator, which is computationally lightweight
and has been examined for decades. It is implemented in a
range of software projects and the source code is available in
different standard libraries such as Newlib 8 or Musl C 9. The
generator adopts a multiplier that was obtained by Knuth [50,
Chapter 3.3.2, p. 108] but current implementations differ from
the “MMIX” Knuth LCG in its increment. Furthermore, it
truncates the most significant bits of the 64 bit state to 32 bit
output values due to known poor statistical properties of the
lower bits in modulo-2 generators [88].
C. Statistical Analysis with NIST STS
Our first statistical analysis applies the NIST STS test suite
to these generators. The results of the χ2-test are shown in Fig-
ure 5. We display average p2-values, where applicable. Analog
to Section VI-B, tests are only passed after a significant
proportion of repeated successful runs. That is, 96 successful
results for a sample size of 100 sequences. Test 11 and Test
12 (Random Excursions and Random Excursions Variant),
however, are not always applicable and as such, they reduce
the sample size internally. In our configuration, that lead to
proportions of sequences passing one of both tests ranging
from 53/56 to 67/71, in different PRNG measurements.
All generators except for the Xorshift pass all 15 statistical
NIST tests. Xorshift results indicate a failure of the Rank (Bi-
nary Matrix Rank) test. This test analyses linear dependences
8https://sourceware.org/newlib/
9https://wiki.musl-libc.org/
among substrings of a sequence. In our case, all 100 test
sequences fail already the first order hypothesis test and thus,
the χ2-distributions test fails as a consequence. We consider
this as weakness of the Xorshift. The deficit is fixed with the
extensions applied to Xorshift64* and Xoroshiro128+, which
pass all tests.
The Frequency Test on the Mersenne Twister had a very
small p-value on the first run (not displayed here) and we ran
the same test again with altered seed value during initializa-
tion. This succeeded the test as displayed in Figure 5. We
want to stress that the magnitude of a p-value in hypothesis
testing is not a causal measure of quality. This means that a
low p-value confirms to reject a null hypothesis (sequence
is not random) but it does not claim how likely it is that
the alternative hypothesis is true (sequence is random). For
further interpretation of statistical tests, we refer the reader to
the NIST test suite description [24] and work by Greenland et
al. [89].
D. Statistical Analysis with DIEHARDER
Next, we apply the DIEHARDER test suite to our random
generator candidates. DIEHARDER test values behave similar
to the NIST STS results presented in the previous section,
but procedures are more demanding and failures are more
distinctive.
Results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for each PRNG in
RIOT are displayed in Figure 6. Similar to the NIST tests,
we plot average p2-values, where applicable. In the style of
previous graphs, we display passing tests with gray bars,
and we highlight failed tests with hatched red bars or red
arrows in case that the p2-value is too small to be displayed.
Additionally, we mark weak results with black bars.
All complex generators displayed in the first row of Figure 6
pass all tests. Few test statistics return weak results, which is
expected in 1 % of the test cases due to the uniform distribu-
tion of p-values. The DIEHARDER help page 10 recommends
repeated test executions and analysis of p-value histograms on
weak results. All weak results in Figure 6 passed a repeated
experiment run with a different seed.
Several failures must be observed for the lightweight gen-
erators displayed in the second row of Figure 6. The Tiny
Mersenne Twister fails Tests OQSO (Overlapping Quadruples
Sparse Occupancy Test), and the DNA test, which both ex-
amine the distribution of overlapping substrings in a stream
of random integer values. These results indicate a systematic
problem of the generator.
The Xorshift generator fails the Monobit 2 test, the 32x32
Binary Rank test, and the Count the 1s Stream test. The
Monobit 2 is a derivate of the NIST Frequency test and
measures the proportion of zeros and ones within blocks (12-
bit blocks applied here). Surprisingly, the general Monobit test,
which counts “1” bits in a long sequence of random samples
(100000 samples considered here) does not fail. Hence, the
Xorshift introduces bias within smaller sub-blocks, which is
compensated over the whole sequence. Results persist after
repeated experiment executions with different seeds. Failing
10https://linux.die.net/man/1/dieharder
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Fig. 5: Pseudo Random Numbers: χ2-test results on the distribution of probability values from 15 NIST STS tests. p2-
values≥ 10−4 pass the hypothesis of uniformity.
10−5 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1 100
BirthdaysOPERM 5
32x32 Binary Rank6x8 Binary Rank
BitstreamOPSO
OQSODNA
Count the 1s (stream)Count the 1s (byte)
Parking LotMinimum Distance (2d Circle)
Minimum Distance (3d Sphere)Squeeze Test
SumsRuns
CrapsMarsaglia and Tsang GCD
MonobitRuns
SerialBit Distribution
Generalized Minimum DistancePermutations
Lagged SumKolmogorov-Smirnov Test
dab_bytedistribDCT
Fill TreeFill Tree 2
Monobit 2
Fortuna
10−5 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1 100
CTR PRNG
10−5 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1 100
SHA256PRNG
10−5 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1 100
Mersenne Twister
10−5 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1 100
BirthdaysOPERM 5
32x32 Binary Rank6x8 Binary Rank
BitstreamOPSO
OQSODNA
Count the 1s (stream)Count the 1s (byte)
Parking LotMinimum Distance (2d Circle)
Minimum Distance (3d Sphere)Squeeze Test
SumsRuns
CrapsMarsaglia and Tsang GCD
MonobitRuns
SerialBit Distribution
Generalized Minimum DistancePermutations
Lagged SumKolmogorov-Smirnov Test
dab_bytedistribDCT
Fill TreeFill Tree 2
Monobit 2
Tiny Mersenne Twister
10−5 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1 100
Xorshift
10−5 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1 100
Minimal Standard
10−5 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1 100
Knuth LCG
Test passed Weak result Test failed, p2> (1−10−6) Test failed, p2<10−6
p2-value
Fig. 6: KS-test results on the distribution of probability values from 31 DIEHARDER tests. p2-values in the significance
interval (α, 1− α) with α = 10−6 pass the test. p2-values within the interval (α2, 1− α2) with α2 = 5 · 10−3 are considered
as weak.
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on the matrix rank test was expected, as the equivalent from
the NIST STS already failed in a similar configuration. The
Count the 1s Stream Test examines whether the distribution
of ones in a stream of bytes matches that of uniform ran-
dom bytes (Binomial(8, 0.5)). Failures indicate that Xorshift
output streams produce repeated “words” that appear with
pronounced probability. It is likely that the same effect led to
bad results of the linear dependency test among sub-matrices.
The advanced Xorshift64* and Xoroshiro128+ generators pass
all DIEHARDER tests.
The Minimal Standard generator fails the Bitstream and the
Generalized Minimum Distance test. The first successively
analyses overlapping 20-bit tuples (220 possible words) and
tests the statistic of missing words for a normal distribution.
Failing this test indicates recurrence of patterns with enhanced
probability. The second test places random pairs of points in
a square and tests its squared distances for an exponential
distribution. The Minimal Standard generator fails to produce
outputs that appear independent in this dimension. Finally,
this generator issues a suspiciously high number of weak test
results. For further interpretation of test results, we refer to
the DIEHARDER Test Suite description [49].
E. Statistical Analysis with TestU01
We additionally apply the “BigCrush” from the TestU01
test suite to all software generators. Table V summarizes test
results with failures reflecting the number of reported test
statistics with p-values outside the confidence interval [0.001,
0.9990].
Results reflect a similar picture as depicted by NIST and
DIEHARDER. TestU01, though, stresses more failures due
to a higher number of tests and tighter hypothesis criteria.
According to L’Ecuyer et al. [54], p-values outside the sig-
nificance interval are obtained approximately 2 % of the time,
even if the PRNG behaves well. This, however, should not
reoccur systematically.
The Minimal Standard misses almost half of all tests (45 %),
and the Xorshift fails a surprisingly high number of 58 tests
(35 %), which reduces to 1–2 failures for its enhanced deriva-
tives Xorshift64* and Xoroshiro128+. The Tiny Mersenne
Twisters attains a failure rate of 8 %, which still exceeds the
acceptable rate by a factor of four, whereas the Knuth LCG
performs notably better, failing about 5 % of the test statistics.
For the Mersenne Twister, both failures have a p-value
of more than (1 − 10−15), which significantly misses the
acceptance interval, and unacceptable results reappear with
repeated experiment runs of different start values. This indi-
cates systematic weaknesses. In contrast, all CSPRNGs report
zero or single failures based on p-values at the order of 10−4.
Repeated test executions then passed these tests.
F. Performance Analysis
In the constrained IoT, an important dimension for any base
system primitive lies in its performance. To assess the value
of the different random number generators, we measure the
computational speed, the memory overhead, and the energy
consumption of all random number generators. Thereby, we
consider base mechanisms, and we disable reseeding, if avail-
able.
Throughput. We measure the throughput and speed of
each generator on the IoT STM32F4 hardware platform that
has been introduced in Section VI. Our test applications are
implemented analogously to those presented in Section VI-C.
In addition, we display maximum values for cases, in which
a generator occasionally takes significant time to rebuild its
internal state. Results are summarized in Table VI.
Naturally, the four lightweight generators are fastest. They
can reliably compute a random number in less than a microsec-
ond. The two ultra-lightweight algorithms Knuth LCG and
Xorshift can even produce several numbers per microsecond
on the constrained microcontroller, which must be considered
a very low runtime overhead. With a production rate of more
than five MB/s, these generators could seamlessly support a
stream cypher, if they were cryptographically secure. Unfortu-
nately they are not, but showed some weaknesses in statistical
tests as discussed in the previous section. Xorshift clearly
has the highest throughput. Its derivatives Xorshift64+ and
Xoroshiro128+ perform around 2–3 times slower.
From the complex generators, SHA256PRNG and the
Mersenne Twister are presented with additional maximal val-
ues in processing time. For SHA256PRNG this is due to
the algorithmic property of producing 32 Bytes in one hash
call, which thereafter are split into 8 Byte long integer values.
Hence, a hash value is computed only every fifth call, which
then takes significantly longer. The Mersenne Twister follows
a similar approach, although it does not involve cryptographic
functions. At the initialization and every 624 calls, it generates
624 fresh pseudo-random integers, which takes up to 190µs.
This is orders of magnitudes longer than simply returning a
value from its buffer. This notably degrades its performance
in comparison with the other lightweight generators.
The three cryptographically secure generators Fortuna, CTR
PRNG and SHA256PRNG operate more than one order of
magnitude slower than the general purpose counterparts. All
algorithms involve cryptographic functions (AES-128, SHA-
256), which are computationally expensive on constrained
microcontrollers. Clearly, the SHA256PRNG is the most vital
among all crpyto-generators presented, requiring around 70µs
on every hash computation, which leads to an average time
of 10µs per integer with number caching, and a rate of
almost 400 kB/s. The more advanced NIST Hash DRBG
(SHA-256) doubles the time per integer due to additional
hash computation in the feedback path. The implementation,
however, does not allow number caching. This overhead is
compensated while requesting larger random blocks or streams
because state updates only occur once after each API call,
while generating large outputs requires multiple hashing.
In comparison to SHA256PRNG, the CTR PRNG generates
random four times slower in a stream of numbers, whereas
returning one random integer takes between six and thirty
times longer. The CTR PRNG on the other hand has an
almost constant runtime per integer. It is noteworthy that
up to 16 Bytes can be obtained by the CTR PRNG without
11CTR PRNG always calculates at least one AES-128 cipher on each call
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Generator Fortuna CTR
PRNG
SHA256PRNG Mersenne
Twister
Tiny Mers.
Twist.
Xorshift Minimal
Standard
Knuth LCG
Failures 1/160 0/160 0/160 2/160 13/160 58/160 71/160 9/160
TABLE V: Summary of test results from the “BigCrush” of the TestU01 environment.
Generator Byte rate[kB/s]
Avg. time
per Int. [us]
Max. time
per Int. [us]
Fortuna 44 87.50 –
CTR PRNG 102 442.0111 –
SHA256PRNG 393 10.04 69.60
Mersenne Twister 3605 0.85 189.20
Tiny Mers. Twist. 4807 0.62 –
Xorshift 8152 0.28 –
Minimal Standard 3348 0.98 –
Knuth LCG 6147 0.44 –
TABLE VI: PRNG throughput and processing time measured
on STM32F4.
runtime overhead because this generator computes one AES-
128 block on every call that delivers 128 Bit from which four
32 Bit integers can be created. The Fortuna operates slowest
when requesting continuous random data and it halves the
throughput of the CTR PRNG. It has a constant runtime per
integer of less than 90µs, which on the other hand is faster by
a factor of five than the CTR PRNG. It requires approximately
120 % of time as the SHA256PRNG when processing a new
hash internally (every eighth call), why the rate is less by a
factor of almost ten.
It is worth noting that the different design choices between
SHA256PRNG and CTR PRNG relate to security implications.
Holding a precomputed hash value in RAM as SHA256PRNG
does while only one integer is requested may violate security
requirements. In the presence of protected memory, a generator
could secure its state and its cached numbers to reduce the
attack surface. Low-cost devices often lack memory protection
mechanisms and as such, a design might be favored that avoids
keeping sensitive data in memory for longer intervals in order
to prevent (i) manipulation of future output (see Section II) as
well as (ii) predicting future random numbers (see Section III).
In the presence of frequent re-seeding from fresh entropy, the
generator state becomes less sensitive to memory attacks. In
contrast, the purpose of caching is performance enhancement
and random numbers would be simply returned without update
after re-seeding. Still, the performance per integer request
of the CTR PRNG would notably benefit from a caching
mechanism.
Memory Overhead. Memory is a particular scarce resource
on IoT devices, why memory of random number generators
should have the lowest possible footprint. We evaluate the
memory overhead, which comes on top of a minimal RIOT
build while enabling different PRNGs at compile time for the
target STM32F4 MCU in Figure 7. Numbers are differentiated
w.r.t. RAM and ROM memory. Furthermore, crypto-purpose
generators include dependencies such as hash functions and
ciphers, which are highlighted as “RAM/ROM Dep.”.
Results reassure the unsurprising previous observation that
complexity of the PRNGs correlates with resource consump-
tion. Similar to the throughput measurements, Xorshift, Min-
imal Standard and Knuth LCG generators remain most frugal
in memory and only require around 100 Bytes additional
ROM and few additional Bytes in RAM. The internal state
size (32 bit), i.e., 4 Bytes in RAM suffice for the Xorshift,
whereas the Knuth LCG adds an internal multiplier to a
total of 8 Bytes RAM. Similarly, Xorshift64* has an 8 Byte
state, but it requires additional memory to split and buffer
8 Bytes generated on each cycle into two 32 bit integers. In
total, Xorshift64* allocates 20 Bytes RAM and Xoroshiro128+
allocates 28 Bytes. The Xorshift-derivatives hence operate on
a different scale than the ultra-lightweight alternatives. Both
Mersenne Twisters allocate between 250–300 Bytes in ROM,
whereby the “tiny” version surprisingly requires the higher
amount. The Mersenne Twister is comparably RAM intensive
by allocating up to 2.5 kB, which is mainly used for its buffer
of 624 integers.
Crypto-secure PRNG such as SHA256PRNG and CTR
PRNG are rather efficient in RAM when compared to the
Mersenne Twister, but are more demanding in ROM mem-
ory. This is mainly due to its dependencies cryptographic
functions. The NIST Hash DRBG (SHA-256) uses similarly
much RAM as the SHA256PRNG but it requires additional
800 Bytes ROM. Reasons for that relate to the extra logic in
the state update function as well was reseeding capabilities
of this CSPRNG. The most demanding generator in terms
of ROM memory is the Fortuna due to its dependencies to
multiple cryptographic functions. It includes the SHA-256 and
the AES-128 RIOT modules, which is the main source of
high ROM requirement. Furthermore, the Fortuna internally
implements an entropy pool that by default initializes 32 SHA-
256 contexts, one of which requires 104 Bytes. This is the main
reason for its high RAM consumption of around 3,5 kB. Here
it must be stressed that this already consumes 10 % of the
available memory on the test device, or 44 % on an Arduino
Mega 2560.
Energy Consumption. We evaluate the energy consumption
with the same setup as described in Section VI. Figure 8 dis-
plays the energy consumed by each pseudo-random generators
in RIOT, measured on the STM32F4 platform. The Fortuna,
CTR PRNG and the SHA256PRNG crypto-purpose generators
are most expensive in energy—up to several micro Joule per
integer. Thereby, SHA256PRNG operates at the lower end
and the SHA256-based NIST Hash DRBG consumes about
twice as much. The CTR PRNG notably demands maximal
resources. Using approximately 24µJ it drains a factor of 3.7
more energy than the Fortuna. The CTR PRNG generates four
integers in one call, why it outperforms the Fortuna slightly
in a stream of random numbers.
All other PRNGs operate on the same scale as the on-
chip HWRNG on that device (compare Figure 4), which takes
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Fig. 7: PRNG memory overhead in ROM (left) and RAM (right) measured on the STM32F4 microcontroller. “Dep.” denotes
memory requirements of dependent software modules (i.e., hashes, ciphers) that a generator may include.
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Fig. 8: PRNG energy consumption per integer measured on a
STM32F4 microcontroller.
approximately 0.03µJ. Non-cryptographic generators remain
by a factor of 20–100 below the most efficient cryptographic
generator SHA256PRNG. The most resource-friendly general-
purpose PRNGs are the Xorshift with an average of 0.01µJ
and the Knuth LCG with 0.02µJ per integer, which is in
agreement with our findings from throughput measurements
in Table VI. The enhanced Xorshift64* and Xoroshiro128+
consume 3–4 times more energy than their lightweight 32
bit Xorshift companion, which is a notable increase over the
Knuth LCG.
G. Recommendations on Software-PRNGs
Having examined eleven widely available software-PRNGs
(eight algorithms plus three variants) that cover the basic
levels and functions, we are now ready to make the choice of
recommendation for random number generators to be included
in a constrained IoT operating system. Following the previous
discussion in Section IV, we differentiate our selections in one
general purpose and one crypto-secure PRNG as two different
system functions.
General Purpose Generator. The general purpose generator
should be very lightweight, while complying with common
statistical requirements. It should run seamlessly on very
constrained 8 bit microcontrollers at low energy costs.
From the two ultra-lightweight generators, only the Knuth
LCG passes all NIST and Dieharder statistical tests. It per-
forms second best. The Xorshift generator consumes about half
of its resources, but has notable statistical flaws. The Knuth
LCG produces better output sequences while being similarly
fast. The enhanced Xorshift64* or Xoroshiro128+ generators
exceed resource consumption of the Knuth LCG significantly.
All other lightweight generators admit lower statistical quality
at higher cost. We therefore recommend the Knuth LCG to
be used as general-purpose, non-cryptographic PRNG in the
constrained IoT.
Crypto-secure Generator. The Fortuna, SHA256PRNG,
(NIST Hash DRBG,) and CTR PRNG are the only candidates
for a CSPRNG, as they are constructed from secure and non-
invertible cryptographic functions. They pass all statistical
tests (including BigCrush) and fulfill the requirements of
unpredictability and brute-force resistance.
Perfect forward and backward secrecy after a state com-
promise is assured by the Fortuna, CTR PRNG and the
NIST Hash DRBG based on their one-way nature during state
update in combination with re-seeding. The SHA256PRNG
holds a (linear combination of) the previous-to-last state and
thus only guarantees forward secrecy for earlier values due
to its secure one-way SHA-256 output function (cf., [13]).
Backward secrecy can be added by reseeding on demand to
the generator as discussed in III-C.
This generator stands out as it is the only cryptographically
secure algorithm that attains moderate performance values. All
competitors exceed the SHA-256 performance measures by
one order of magnitude in at least one dimension. We con-
clude that the resource frugality in combination with modular
cryptographic robustness justify to commend SHA256PRNG
as the CSPRNG in the constrained IoT.
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VIII. HARDWARE OR SOFTWARE GENERATED
RANDOMNESS IN THE IOT?
An increasing number of embedded controllers is expected
to provide hardware primitives for basic cryptographic op-
erations in the near future, which bring promise of fast
and efficient random generators that contribute real entropy.
The performance of on-chip HWRNGs, however, is heteroge-
neous. Some devices operate fast and save battery resources
(i.e., STM32F4), while others are slow and require notably
larger amounts of energy (i.e., nRF52840) than corresponding
software. As shown in Section VI, few devices even produce
poor statistical output (i.e., CC2538). Some manufacturers
advice against an immediate use for cryptographic random
number. Other manufacturers describe their on-chip random
number generators as suitable for cryptographic purposes with-
out providing a cryptographic proof (Nordic). Truly random
generators rely on real entropy from a physical process. This
may be influenced by environmental factors, which opens an
attack surface.
Common IoT operating system such as RIOT need to make
decisions on which hardware functions to include and how to
integrate hardware and software components into the random
subsystem. These multi-platform multi-purpose systems want
to provide an overall lean solution of reliable quality at a
predictable performance. To aid this design process, we now
analyze key performance properties of the different hardware-
and software-based random number generators.
In Figure 9, we compare energy consumption and average
generation time per integer (left) as well as the average current
flow (right) for the hardware systems summarized in Table I.
Software generators are measured on the STM32F4 board.
We observe that the lightweight software generators are
fastest and together with the HWRNG on the chip of
STM32F4 consume least energy. While software PRNGs oper-
ate up to five times faster, they charge a higher current than the
HWRNG which results in a similar energy footprint. On-chip
hardware generators on the CC2328 and MKW22D devices
consume about one order of magnitude more time and energy.
Hence we argue for the choice of a lightweight software
generator (i.e., the Knuth LCG) for the regular production
of random numbers. Hardware generators are best used for
(re-)seeding, when true entropy is required.
Running a cryptographically secure generator demands
unsurprisingly more energy resources in comparison to its
lightweight PRNG alternatives or the STM32F4 on-chip
HWRNG solution. Among the three software CSPRNGs,
SHA256PRNG is clearly most frugal with an energy con-
sumption of 0.5µJ for one integer and an average current
consumption of 17 mA. Note that caching is involved here,
thus, only every eighth requested integer involves computation
of a new hash which then causes currents up to 20 mA. Fortuna
and CTR PRNG drain notably more energy in comparison to
the SHA256PRNG as already visible in the previous analysis.
CTR PRNG consumes up to 24µJ for one integer, which
is four times more than Fortuna, even though its average
current consumption is similar to the SHA256PRNG that uses
5 mA less than Fortuna. The increased energy consumption
for one integer may be compensated in a stream or by
caching intermediate numbers. Hardware based random num-
bers on the nRF52840 controller consume energy similar to
the CSPRNGs, although the low-power MCU drains less than
5 mA in both operation modes (w/ and w/o bias correction).
This is due to its slow operation.
The external ATECC508A chip, which implements an ap-
proved CSPRNG in hardware, exhibits a worse performance
than all software CSPRNGs. The throughput of the software
solutions is 20–100 times higher while the energy consump-
tion remains 3–10 times less. The average current of the
ATECC508A solution remains small in comparison to the
software solutions that do not even have to power a second
device. This is because the main controller idles while the
external chip processes random values. The external chip
requires only a small current as shown in Section VI-C.
Eventually, the total energy consumption can be improved by
further driver optimizations. A minimum of 280µJ is required
to request from one up to eight integers. It is noteworthy
that this chip implements secure seeding on its own, which
enhances very constrained devices without proper entropy
sources.
Memory limitations of very constrained devices (e.g., AT-
mega2560 with only 8 kB RAM and 256 kB Flash) are un-
able to run complex software CSPRNGs as they require
more memory. The Fortuna CSPRNG would take almost
50% of the ATmega2560 RAM leaving only 4 kB for the
remaining firmware. This is not sufficient for real-world IoT-
networking applications [45]. Instead, the device driver for
the ATECC508A chip can be included which (i) reduces the
memory requirements of cryptographic functions, (ii) offloads
processing of complex algorithms on the device, and (iii)
includes additional crypto-related features at the same time.
Next to the dedicated crypto-chip, other external random-
ness generators, namely the AT86RF233 transceiver as well as
the SRAM PUF are energy expensive using up to one order of
magnitude more than the SHA256PRNG. Both mechanisms,
though, are not designed to be used periodically. Instead, they
act as seed sources that are utilized once during instantiation
of a PRNG and on re-seeding. The current consumptions differ
notably between the transceiver and the PUF SRAM. The
transceiver powers two devices in active mode because the
MCU polls random bytes via the SPI while the radio needs to
stay in receive mode. This draws a current of up to 26 mA in
total. The PUF SRAM on the other hand takes twice as long
to retrieve a high entropy integer but it drains less than 10 mA
on average. As depicted in Section VI-A, this procedure needs
to take place very early on startup—even before clock and bus
initialization in the operating system.
In summary, we argue that software generators—
a lightweight general purpose PRNG or an approved
CSPRNG—are the preferable solution for producing (secure)
random numbers. Co-processors and hardware assistance are
vital for adding entropy at (re-)seeding instances and can help
to improve memory footprints for very constrained devices.
They lead to a decreased throughput, though, when compared
to software that runs on the main controller. In particular,
transceivers as well as uninitialized SRAM are very important
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Fig. 9: Average energy consumption over average time (left) and average current draw (right) for hardware and software
generated random integers.
on devices with missing HWRNGs. Even though PUF SRAM
and the radio-based entropy sources are costly, they uniquely
contribute entropy and are only sparsely called for seeding
purposes.
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
In this paper, we explored the building blocks for ran-
domness in the constrained Internet of Things: hardware
and software components that generate statistical randomness,
entropy, and robustness according to cryptographic challenges.
We systematically derived the requirements for IoT random
subsystems from the perspectives of statistics, security, and
operating system integration. An extensive, comparative eval-
uation using several prominent test suites as well as detailed
performance measurements on popular boards delivered in-
sights into the overall quality and suitability of the different
components under test.
This work derives four major recommendations:
1) Separate general purpose random generators from cryp-
tographically secure generators already on the OS level.
Avoid any mixture or interference between the two.
2) Prefer software generators over random hardware, as
they are more efficient and reliable. Exploit hardware
components as additional entropy sources for (re-)see-
ding, or when CSPRNG operation is infeasible on a
constrained node.
3) The Knuth LCG is the most efficient general purpose
generator of decent statistical quality. It is simple and
lean enough to run on very constrained devices.
4) We recommend SHA256 PRNG as a cryptographically
secure generator, since it outperforms its competitors by
an order of magnitude in several dimensions.
With this work, we hope to contribute to a thoughtful
development toward a secure Internet of Things. This will be
of particular importance, as more and more (sensitive) data
originates from IoT nodes and needs protection. Content object
security with OSCORE [90], [91] and LAKE [92], for ex-
ample, will facilitate the encryption of individual information
units, but will extend the use of cryptographic primitives such
as random numbers during operation.
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